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CREDIBILITY AND INFORMATION 
 IN SECURITIES MARKETS AFTER 
REGULATION FD 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON∗ 
RONALD KING∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulation FD,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) new 
rules that prevent companies from selectively disclosing information to 
analysts, reflects the agency’s broad concern for fairness among traders.2 The 
Regulation’s ultimate success will depend as much on a second factor— 
whether it adversely affects the total set of information available to market 
participants. This Article focuses on Regulation FD’s likely effects on the 
availability and reliability of information and the resulting informativeness of 
market prices.3 In particular, this Article discusses issues related to the 
amount of information issuers disclose, the amount of research analysts 
conduct, and the reliability of the combination of information provided by 
those two functions. These new rules redefine the information space within 
which issuers and analysts act, potentially tilting the information market to 
rely more on analysts and less on issuers. 
The Regulation responds to the longstanding practice of many companies 
to reveal some information about themselves to the market, not in a 
government disclosure form, but by telling selected analysts or shareholders.4 
Those companies now face an all or nothing choice: they are not required to 
disclose any more information than before, but if they tell someone, they 
must tell everyone. The Regulation requires that a company5 disclosing 
nonpublic information about itself to market professionals or shareholders 
 
 
 ∗ New York Alumni Chancellor’s Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Accounting, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.100 (2000). 
 2. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter Final Release]. In the Release, the agency 
identifies “FD” as standing for “Fair disclosure.” Id. at 51,716. 
 3. Informativeness of market prices refers to the extent to which information is impounded in 
prices. 
 4. See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turns 
Analysts’ Rite Into a Hectic Affair, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at C1. 
 5. An individual acting on the company’s behalf also cannot disclose information. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 243.100(a) (2001). 
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likely to trade on the information must simultaneously disclose the 
information to the public at large.6 
II. INFORMATION REACHING THE SECURITIES MARKETS 
In proposing Regulation FD, the SEC began with the observation: 
“Information is the lifeblood of our securities markets.”7 While proscribing 
one set of information transfers, the agency sought to avoid reducing the 
overall amount of information available to investors.8 The total set of 
information available to investors is a complex combination of a company’s 
disclosures about itself, information produced by information intermediaries, 
and the information investors generate for themselves or infer from market 
prices. This Article focuses on information specific to a company as opposed 
to information relevant to the entire market. 
A. Company Disclosure 
 What a company discloses about itself reflects both its economic 
incentives to reveal information and what the government requires it to 
disclose. The basic story about a firm’s incentive to disclose is well known. 
As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel describe the firm’s dilemma, “If 
the firm simply asked for money without disclosing the project and managers 
involved . . . it would get nothing. Investors would assume the worst, 
because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to say for 
itself, it would do so.”9 Thus, firms disclose more information to sell shares 
at a higher price.10 They use verification and certification devices to 
distinguish themselves from other firms that might otherwise try to mimic 
their behavior without the results that support such action. 
Beginning in 1933, federal law added a strong dose of government-
mandated disclosure to the information set otherwise available because of the 
 
 
 6. Id. If the disclosure is unintentional, the same disclosure must be made promptly to the 
public. Id. § 243.100(a)(2). “Promptly” means within twenty-four hours or prior to the commencement 
of the next day’s trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. § 243.101(d) (2000). The Regulation 
also defines the acceptable means of public disclosure. Id. §§ 243.100, 243.101(c),(e) (2000). 
 7. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (proposed Dec. 20, 
1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter Proposing Release]. 
 8. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Luncheon Address to the American Law Institute (May 16, 2000) 
(“The trick for the SEC was to end selective disclosure, if possible, without producing 
counterproductive effects, without stopping the flow of information to analysts, shareholders, and 
others.”). 
 9. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 
70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984). 
 10. Id. 
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market participants’ economic incentives.11 The motivations for such 
legislation12 is not central to this discussion.13 The result is that the 
information set coming from companies includes various financial numbers 
and other data in a variety of forms required by statute, together with 
substantial additional information provided by companies about themselves 
or by outsiders about those companies.  
B. Information From Noncompany Sources 
A healthy securities market requires more information than companies 
normally provide about themselves. Other actors possess or pursue a variety 
of information about a company that can inform the securities marketplace. 
These sources include: (1) information from one’s own work; (2) information 
sought from others; and (3) information from prices. 
1. Information From One’s Own Work 
Information about a particular company ends up in the possession of 
various market participants without any specific action on their part to seek 
the information. Employees and other insiders at the company, customers, 
suppliers, and competitors, each learn material information about the 
company in the course of dealing with it. In addition, government or private 
regulators may obtain material information.14 
2. Information Sought From Others 
Many players in the markets regularly pursue information about a 
company beyond that which may be provided by the company itself. Some 
private investors find it worthwhile to seek additional information. Analysts 
and other similar information providers make it their business to develop 
information to trade on themselves or to sell to others. In addition, the 
financial media are a source of useful information. 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000). 
 12. Legislative motives could include the fact that: managers’ incentives to disclose may not be 
completely aligned with their companies; there may be an oversupply of some information and 
verification; or the fact that some firms were trying to raise costs of their competitors. 
 13. For a discussion of the justification for a mandatory disclosure system, see generally John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Market Failures and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 717, 720-23 (1984). 
 14. Consider for example, the information about tires on sport utility vehicles that came into the 
hands of lawyers and government safety regulators prior to widespread public disclosure of those tire 
problems. 
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3. Information Provided by Price 
Beyond the specific information sources just described, price itself is a 
source of information that may complement or substitute for those sources. 
For some traders in an efficient market, information from prices may be a 
sufficient base of information to justify securities trades.15 
Indeed, each of the sources listed here is necessarily affected by the 
others. For each source, and for different users of the same source, differing 
search and verification costs exist that will determine the intensity of its use. 
If a company decreases the amount of information it releases, or price 
becomes less informative, market participants might well look to these other 
sources to make up the difference, depending on the costs and benefits of 
each. Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman claim the cost of information is 
the core concept that shapes the role that analysts and other participants play 
in an information system and in contributing to an efficient market.16 
Acquisition costs, processing or deciphering costs, and verification costs are 
the central mechanisms in determining how quickly market prices 
incorporate new information.17  
C. The Role of Analysts and Selective Disclosure 
The Supreme Court concluded in Dirks v. SEC18 that analysts are 
“necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”19 The Court’s opinion in 
Dirks quoted with approval the SEC’s recognition of the role of analysts: 
“[T]he value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; 
market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to 
ferret out and analyze information and thus the analysts’ work redounds to 
the benefit of all investors.”20 
Analysts play a crucial role in the process by which the market 
incorporates information into the price of securities.21 They sometimes 
 
 
 15. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 572-77 (1984) (discussing trade decoding and price decoding). 
 16. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 568-71. 
 17. Id. Gilson & Kraakman identify acquisition costs as the cost of production or acquiring the 
information from someone else; processing includes the human costs of evaluating information, a skill 
that often requires professional training; and verification reflects the need to determine the quality of 
information. 
 18. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 19. Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983). 
 20. Id. at 658 n.17 (citing 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406 (1981)). 
 21. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 13, at 723-24 (“[M]ost accounts explaining the stock market’s 
efficiency assign a substantial responsibility to the competition among analysts for securities 
information.”). 
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contribute new information not otherwise available about the company and, 
at other times, analysts are the mechanisms by which publicly distributed 
information becomes incorporated into price.22 They occupy an intermediate 
position within the universe of traders as measured by available information, 
typically possessing less information about a company than its insiders, but 
more information than noise traders.23  
The traditional information market has included the company 
communicating directly to analysts without simultaneously communicating 
with the entire market, conduct that Regulation FD now seeks to eliminate.24 
In Dirks, the Supreme Court observed: 
[I]t is commonplace for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze 
information’ and this often is done by meeting with and questioning 
corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that 
the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the 
market worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s judgment in 
this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients 
of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of 
the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made 
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the 
public generally.25 
The motivation for selective disclosure instead of disclosure to the entire 
market can be attributed to several purposes we discuss separately below. 
First, the nature of some information may create or contribute to the need for 
 
 
 22. See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,217 (Dec. 4, 1998) 
(codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 202, 210, 228-30, 232, 239, 240, 249) (discussing how analysts “digest 
information . . . put it all in context, and act as conduits in the flow of information by publishing 
reports explaining the effect of this to investors”). See also Sok Tae Kim et al., Market Structure, 
Informed Trading and Analysts’ Recommendations, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 507, 515 
(1997) (finding that private information disseminated by analysts who initiate coverage with a buy 
recommendation is reflected in stock prices in less than 15 minutes). See generally Randall S. Thomas 
& James F. Cotter, Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2000) (discussing the level of analysts following that will impact a firm’s 
price). 
 23. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 568-88 (describing four general forms 
of market efficiency mechanisms proposed by financial economists: universally informed trading, 
professionally informed trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading). 
 24. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.  
The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material 
nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals 
and holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must 
make public disclosure of that information. 
Id. 
 25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59 (internal citation omitted). 
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selective disclosure. Second, use of selective disclosure may produce a 
benefit to the company. Third, selective disclosure may produce a private 
benefit. 
1. Selective Disclosure Because of the Nature of the Information 
A common analogy used to describe the positive contribution of analysts 
in the information market refers to a mosaic.26 Analysts retrieve bits of 
otherwise immaterial information and, in doing so, come to see a mosaic not 
readily visible to others. Most would describe a larger, more important role: 
“[M]any corporate managers have come to see the analyst community as an 
appropriate avenue for making minor, but material, disclosures to the 
market” where a press release is too “blunt [an] instrument.”27 There may be 
information that management cannot disclose in the market for competitive 
reasons, but such information can be communicated to the market via 
discussions with analysts and their subsequent trading. There may be 
information that will be misunderstood initially. Discussions with analysts 
can contribute to a more accurate interpretation and prevent market 
overreaction or excessive volatility. At the time of the implementation of 
Regulation FD, one analyst estimated that twenty-five percent of accuracy in 
analysts’ earnings models has always come from companies through such 
selective disclosure.28  
2. Selective Disclosure to Obtain a Company Benefit 
Apart from whether the type of information requires selective disclosure, 
a company may find nevertheless that selective disclosure serves a company 
interest. The company could structure the information set and choose the 
recipients of the disclosure. Giving some analysts monopoly benefits as to 
particular information may be a necessary incentive to get analysts to follow 
the company, thereby providing liquidity and better pricing that will benefit 
shareholders as a group. The relationship provides economic benefits to both 
the analysts and the company. By gaining access to information not 
completely incorporated into market price, analysts could, over time, have a 
return that beats the market. In exchange, the company gets analysts who 
follow its stock, supply information that helps increase the accuracy of the 
 
 
 26. See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of “Fair Disclosure” Rule, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at C1. 
 27. Scott Rosen, Regulation FD: The Inside Scoop, INNOVATOR, (I/B/E/S Int’l) Dec. 2000, at 1. 
 28. Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of ‘Fair Disclosure Rule, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2000, at C1 (quoting Matthew Berler, an analyst at Morgan, Stanley, Dean Witter & Co.). 
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share price, and reduce the mispricing risk facing investors. The activity 
likely makes the stock’s price movement less volatile and provides additional 
liquidity in the stock’s trading.29 
3. Selective Disclosure to Obtain a Private Benefit 
Opportunistic managers may engage in selective disclosure, not 
necessarily to benefit the company, but to benefit themselves. For example, 
the insider could receive a suitcase full of money in exchange for the 
information. Such conduct would easily violate current insider trading 
prohibitions and does not appear to be the motivation for Regulation FD. 
However, parallel, harder to detect trade-offs could support the Regulation. 
For example, managers might selectively disclose information to facilitate 
acquisitions of a block of stocks by friendly hands that might help protect 
management from a takeover.30 
D. The Economics of Selective Disclosure 
Whatever the motivation, how should we balance the various factors that 
enter into a selective disclosure decision? In a current paper, Professor 
Stephen Choi suggests an “informational disparity” framework to balance 
four considerations: (1) the amount an analyst or other investor spends to 
obtain information, (2) the benefit to analysts from trading with an 
information advantage, (3) the loss suffered by the uninformed trader on the 
other side of such a transaction, and (4) the benefit to the company and the 
market generally from more accurate pricing.31 Choi suggests that if 
managers are not behaving opportunistically, the company will internalize all 
 
 
 29. Opdyke, supra note 28, at C21 (“Companies played along because it helped them manage 
investor expectations and keep their stock prices from swinging violently.”). But see Richard Frankel 
et al., An Empirical Evaluation of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium, J. ACCT. RES., 
Apr. 1, 1999, at 133, available at 1999 WL 25035824, at *5 (noting that issuer conference calls are 
often followed with abnormal trading volume and greater price volatility). 
 30. See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2001) (suggesting selective disclosures may induce outside investors to construct a 
block, whose monitoring of management would benefit all shareholders). See also Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 462 (1986) 
(noting that large blockholders have greater incentives than small dispersed shareholders to monitor 
managers for agency problems). See generally Michael J. Barclay et al., The Block Pricing Puzzle 
(Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (examining the difference in price between 
acquiring a large percentage of stock directly from the corporation in a private placement—priced at a 
nineteen percent discount—and acquiring the shares directly from another shareholder—an average 
eleven percent premium—as reflecting implicit compensation for helping entrench management from 
the market for corporate control). 
 31. See Choi, supra note 30, at 16. 
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costs associated with the selective disclosure of information. Therefore, Choi 
argues that the decision to disclose information selectively should be left to 
the company rather than the government.32 
Where managers act in the best interest of shareholders, managers will 
employ a selective disclosure policy that best maximizes shareholder 
welfare, balancing the cost of information production, the benefit to 
the party receiving the selective disclosure, . . . the loss to [the 
company’s] own uninformed shareholders, and finally the increase in 
accuracy in [the company’s] stock price.33  
If managers behave opportunistically, Choi recognizes a benefit of 
regulation.34 However, he also asks, somewhat provocatively, if that is not a 
question left to state law under the current division of responsibility between 
federal and state governments, as evidenced by cases such as Business 
Roundtable v. SEC.35 
If these “informational disparity” factors are measured in absolute terms, 
two factors are likely to be positive and two are likely to be negative, but a 
direct summation of the four likely will be incomplete. The company does 
not cares about the absolute gain and loss in parts 2 and 3, but does care 
about how much uninformed traders will reduce the price they initially pay 
for the shares because of fear that, later, they will be induced to trade with an 
analyst who has an information advantage due to selective disclosure. The 
company also cares about how much the analyst will do for the company 
because the analyst receives the benefit of the gain on any transaction while 
possessing an information advantage. The benefit of these two components 
collectively is likely to correspond to the fourth component, the additional 
amount investors will pay for the stock because of its reduced mispricing and 
greater liquidity. Further, any price reduction resulting from uninformed 
investors worrying about being on the wrong side of a trade in a selective 
disclosure situation may be small. As insider trading literature has developed, 
any loss results from the new information itself or the change in the 
information set.36 Selective disclosure simply accelerates the time in which 
 
 
 32. Id. at 26. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 35. 
 35. Id. at 56 n.138. See also Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(striking down a SEC rule that went beyond disclosure to regulate the distribution of power among the 
various players in corporate governance).  
 36. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. 
U.L. REV. 1449, 1452-54 (1989). See also HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK 
MARKET 110 (1966) (claiming that trades based on significant inside information are rare). 
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traders realize that loss.37 For a typical uninformed trader to reduce what they 
would initially pay for the stock, he or she would have to expect to lose 
money in trades with selectively informed analysts, but not expect to lose a 
similar amount in trading with more generally informed analysts after the 
information ultimately comes out.38 Uninformed traders are not likely to be at 
the front of the que, in any event. Market makers, however, face the 
possibility of increased trading losses due to the presence of traders with an 
information advantage stemming from selective disclosure. To that extent, 
market makers will increase their bid-ask spread to compensate for these 
losses.39 This will produce an adverse third-party effect if company 
management did not take this into account. 
David Haddock and Jonathan Macey suggest that prohibition of insider 
trading increases the return of market professionals at the expense of 
insiders.40 Insider trading regulation could be seen as preferring the first 
group over the second. For selective disclosure, the impact of the Regulation 
becomes a bit more nuanced and less visible. The ban helps market makers 
and larger market participants, who are likely to be early traders on 
information on a regular basis, rather than a smaller subset of analysts whose 
regular trading has helped make a deeper and more accurate market for a 
stock.  
Another third party effect would occur if company management cared 
less about accurate pricing for its stock than society and the business 
community as a whole. Part of the impetus for Regulation FD was a fear that 
companies were misusing the central role given them in the prior information 
structure to control analysts.41 Because companies could choose to whom 
they selectively disclosed, they would ignore analysts whose reports did not 
reflect a rosy view of the company’s future.42 Analysts, who wanted to 
maintain the flow of information that would enable them to achieve above-
 
 
 37. See Michael P. Dooley, Comment From an Enforcement Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 319, 321 (1999) (“Insiders are incidental participants in a zero-sum game between outsiders that 
would go on without them.”). 
 38. For analysis of Rule 10b-5’s effects on various types of traders, see generally William K.S. 
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information in Impersonal Securities Markets: Who is Harmed 
and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL L. REV. 1217 (1981). 
 39. See G.J. BENSTON & R.L. HAGERMAN, BID-ASK SPREADS IN THE OTC MARKET (1974) 
(reporting a positive correlation between breadth of bid-ask spread and companies with greater 
unsystematic risk where chances of trading with a better informed insider would be greater). 
 40. David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, 
With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 327-30 (1987). 
 41. See Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716-17 (Aug. 15, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 243, 249). 
 42. Id. 
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average returns, would avoid harsh criticism of existing management to curry 
the necessary favor to keep the preferred channel open.43 While managers 
may want to avoid negative analysts’ reports, they do seem to care about 
negative earnings surprises that occur when actual earnings disappoint the 
market. In the years leading up to Regulation FD, analysts’ estimates 
appeared to be getting more accurate in predicting company earnings.44 
Negative earnings surprises decreased as a share of all variances from 
expected earnings, a result that probably occurred because companies guided 
analysts to avoid surprises.45 Such a surprise is more likely to put a 
manager’s job at risk, creating an individual incentive to disseminate 
information, but the information itself still benefits investors.46 If this fear of 
negative earnings surprises operates to discipline management’s channeling 
of selective disclosure, finding third party effects in selective disclosure may 
require developing a larger story about managers’ ability to massage or 
manipulate earnings while still avoiding earnings surprises.  
III. REGULATION FD’S EFFECT ON THE SUPPLY OF INFORMATION 
Regulation FD shuts off one long-standing source of information entering 
the market place. In its initial proposal, the SEC emphasized full as well as 
fair disclosure.47 In its final promulgating release, the SEC expressed 
repeated concern about “chilling” the supply of information available to the 
marketplace.48 Several antidotes seem possible to any reduction in the supply 
of information that might be caused by the selective disclosure ban in the 
Regulation: Issuers may pick up the slack and disclose the same information 
to the market; analysts may work harder or other private users of information 
may increase their efforts to obtain information about a company. We 
explore these antidotes and discuss whether there are reliability concerns 
apart from the volume of information. 
 
 
 43. Id. at 51,717. 
 44. Rosen, supra note 27, at 1. 
 45. Id. at 1, 6 (noting that companies roughly split in exceeding or falling below consensus 
earnings predictions of analysts). After 1993, negative surprises decreased to twenty percent of the 
total, while positive surprises accounted for more than sixty percent. See id. 
 46. Rosen, supra note 27, at 1, 6. 
 47. Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (proposed Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
 48. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718-19. 
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A. Companies’ Ability to Provide Information Previously Given Via 
Selective Disclosure 
The Regulation does not prevent companies from publicly disclosing the 
information previously given to analysts. Indeed, the SEC hopes and 
anticipates an increase in public disclosure.49 The final release estimates that 
there will be an additional 65,000 8-K filings per year, an average of five for 
each registered company.50 Press releases and other means of satisfying the 
Regulation’s mandate to prevent selective disclosures will likewise increase 
the amount of publicly available information compared to that available 
under the prior practice.  
Perhaps the most visible evidence of increase in a company’s public 
disclosure of information is the greater incidence of open conference calls—
companies making use of modern telecommunications technology to open up 
analysts’ meetings with top managers previously limited to a select few.51 A 
National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) survey of issuer practices 
reported a noticeable trend in this direction, even before the promulgation of 
Regulation FD,52 and published reports over the last year suggest this trend 
has become very common. A post-FD NIRI survey indicated that about a 
quarter of companies provide more information to analysts and investors 
since FD went into effect, about one quarter provide less information, and 
about half said they provide the same amount of information.53 
Companies continue to have the same economic incentives to ensure the 
release of sufficient accurate information about their company for the reasons 
stated in Part II of this Article. Thus, even if companies might prefer 
selective disclosure, once that channel is closed off, they still retain an 
incentive to release information through other channels, such as public filings 
or open conference calls. Disclosing positive news can lead to higher prices; 
disclosing negative news can avoid negative earning surprises that might 
adversely affect the company’s stock. The SEC recounted one 
 
 
 49. Id. at 51,733. 
 50. Id. at 51,731-32. 
 51. See Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference-Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turn 
Analysts’ Rite Into a Hectic Affair, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at C1. 
 52. National Investor Relations Institute, A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practices 7-8 (May 
1998). 
 53. National Investor Relations Institute, Corporate Disclosure Practices Survey (Feb. 26, 2001) 
(on file with author). See also 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 335 (Mar. 5, 2001) (quoting NIRI CEO 
as stating, “Our survey suggests, however, that Regulation FD is largely working as the SEC 
envisioned to provide more equal access to information”). Until more specific data becomes available, 
it will be difficult to draw any detailed conclusions about the regulation’s impact on the overall 
information set.  
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commentator’s observation that the marketplace simply would not allow 
issuers to cease communications with analysts and security holders.54  
 Are there reasons to think that companies will fall short of the amount of 
disclosure that characterized pre-FD, even if they do not “cease” 
communications? Certainly around the time the SEC adopted the Regulation 
and when it became effective, there were stories of companies who canceled 
meetings with analysts and reduced the amount of disclosed information.55 
What might explain less disclosure after the selective disclosure ban? 
1. No Required Disclosure 
As the SEC notes, the federal securities laws do not require disclosure of 
all material information.56 Much of the information that a company 
previously disclosed selectively to analysts, and which a company is now 
considering whether to disclose, will not have to be immediately released. 
This is not to say that at some point in the future, the company may have to 
disclose the information in a quarterly or annual report or a proxy 
solicitation; but, for the moment, mandatory disclosure does not replace the 
function previously performed by selective disclosure.  
2. Information Withheld for Fear of Liability 
Regulation FD forbids selective disclosure, but the SEC made clear that 
noncompliance does not give rise to private liability for damages.57 But even 
with that caveat, the Regulation states a prohibition on conduct that can bring 
SEC action and public opprobrium.58 Thus, we can expect managers to pay 
more attention to what the Regulation prohibits managers from saying and 
not as much to what the silence of the Regulation may permit them to 
 
 
 54. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718. 
 55. Mum’s the Word in the Wake of Disclosure Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2000, at C1 (“Some 
corporate managers are evading queries, even about topics they would have discussed in the past, 
fearful that answers might cross into forbidden territory.”); Phyllis Plitch, SEC Rules Prompt Merrill 
to Limit Analysts Access to Executives, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Oct. 24, 2000 (reporting Merrill 
Lynch policy restricting analysts’ access to insiders and quoting a Merrill Lynch corporate secretary, 
“In the real world, many more companies will put a muzzle on most of the employee population”). 
 56. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731-32.  
 57. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718. But see Michael G. Lange & Chauncey D. Steele IV, 
The Probable Effects of Regulation FD on Private Securities Litigation 5-6 (Mar. 9, 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). (“[J]ust because the SEC says that a Reg[ulation] FD 
violation will not be “deemed” a violation . . . does not make it so. Courts ultimately determine the 
scope of § 10(b) liability, not the agency.”).  
 58. See Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (proposed Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (“If an issuer fails to comply with Regulation FD however, it will be subject 
to an SEC enforcement action.”). 
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affirmatively take the initiative to communicate. It does not seem surprising 
to expect that the net result will be less information, not more. The disclosure 
contemplated by the rule, moreover, does bring a new set of costs inherent in 
filing an 8-K or otherwise making sufficient public disclosure,59 a cost that 
can lead managers to err on the side of being silent.  
The impact on individual managers may differ from the impact on the 
company, an asymmetry that may contribute to nondisclosure. Saying 
something to analysts that you should not have said creates consequences 
that may be visited directly on an individual manager for failing to meet 
federal regulations.60 The benefit of that same statement would accrue to the 
company with less benefit to an individual manager. Thus, individual 
managers’ cost-benefit analysis would encourage less communication. 
3. Information for Which Disclosure Destroys its Value 
Certain information cannot be revealed without also revealing a 
company’s proprietary information, a process that would adversely affect the 
company. Some information that is positive to a company cannot be revealed 
without destroying some or all of its benefit to the company, in part by 
exposing it to competitors who can use that information for their own 
benefits.61 Companies face difficult choices in choosing between credible 
disclosure or destroying the value of the information.62 Companies 
previously invested in a network of company-analyst relationships in which 
the companies had the primary incentive for developing a reputation of 
reliability over time. In such a setting, companies could effectively 
communicate the effect of the information without exposing it to misuse by 
competitors. In the alternative system, where the legal rules give analysts the 
greater incentive to develop reputation and certification abilities, information 
will be less able to be passed to the market without destroying much of its 
value. 
 
 
 59. See Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,732 (estimating that Regulation FD would cost issuers, 
on average, five additional burden hours for each Form 8-K filing). 
 60. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2001) (including “any person acting on [the issuer’s] behalf”); 
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(c) (2001) (defining the term “person acting on behalf of an issuer”). 
 61. Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks 
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 142 (1984). 
 62. For example, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., disclosure would have interfered with the 
company’s acquisition of property. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(holding that purchasing stock without disclosing information about the company’s ore strike was a 
violation of Rule 10b-5). 
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4. Information That Cannot Be Easily Interpreted 
The market easily misinterprets information of a specialized nature or 
information that requires connection to other information not readily 
available in order to fully understand its significance. A company’s call to a 
knowledgeable analyst has sometimes pointed professionally informed 
traders in the correct direction.63 The 1998 NIRI study revealing an increase 
in webcast conference calls and a decline in individual calls to analysts 
supports such a use, showing the individual calls that remained often follow 
the press release.64 
B. Analysts Working Harder 
Even if companies reduce the amount of information they make available 
after Regulation FD, the total amount of information available to investors 
will not decline if analysts change what they do or if private investors 
otherwise seek out and obtain additional information. Given the same 
economic incentives discussed in the Part II of this paper, analysts can make 
money via trading when they discover information not yet incorporated into 
the price of a security. Indeed, if companies generally provide less 
information, the potential for gains from searching for information may well 
increase. However, the actual return on such information may be harder to 
predict. Analysts must now work harder to discover information previously 
obtained directly from the issuer. As a result, analysts’ costs will increase 
without a corresponding increase in benefit. This disparity became visible in 
the early days of Regulation FD, where webcast conference calls became 
more hectic and time-consuming for analysts, containing much noise that 
analysts do not find particularly relevant, and providing less opportunity to 
pursue a line of inquiry that would truly interest the analysts.65 If returns do 
not change and costs go up, the expectation is that analysts will redirect their 
 
 
 63. See Opdyke, supra note 28, at C1, C21.  
Because most forest companies operate in a variety of separate wood, paper and pulp segments 
. . . . [leading to ] low predictability of earnings, companies . . . historically have tried “to help 
analysts understand the inputs they use in their models” . . . . [the analyst] would methodically 
walk through the critical suppositions, gauging the executives’ comfort with his numbers. At the 
end of the exercise, “you’ve narrowed in on a tight [earnings] range” . . . . He would check in 
frequently “for little updates to find out how things are going, where any changes are taking place, 
so we have a continuous picture of what to expect.” 
 64. National Investor Relations Institute, supra note 52, at 7, 27. 
 65. Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference-Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turn Analysts’ 
Rite Into a Hectic Affair, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at C1 (describing analysts’ difficulties with 
overlapping conference calls that are lengthier and require analysts to listen to more questions that are 
not directly relevant to their analysis). 
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resources to follow fewer stocks; it is likely that smaller stocks will bear the 
brunt of the decrease and will end up with less liquidity.66 
The SEC has paid considerable attention to the distorting effect on 
analysts’ buy-sell recommendations because of their need to curry favor with 
company’s insiders who have the ability to disperse wealth via selective 
disclosure.67 Freed of this distortion, the expectation is that analysts will be 
more honest in their evaluation, providing tough and honest criticisms of 
managers.68 Buy recommendations have traditionally been the overwhelming 
majority of analysts buy-sell recommendations, with one recent study 
showing that sell recommendations comprised only two percent of the total.69 
To the extent that the need to curry favor is removed, the SEC would expect 
the number of sell recommendations to increase.70 The difficulty is figuring 
out whether there are confounding variables that may explain this result. 
Many analysts have long had conflicting incentives due to their employment 
at firms that have large investment banking businesses that depend on the 
decisions of some of the same executives to whom it was previously 
necessary to curry favor to gain selective disclosure.71 This pressure has not 
disappeared. There are also cognitive reasons why the buy recommendations 
outweigh the sell recommendations and those, too, will continue. 
C. Reliability of Information 
Even if the incentives discussed above operate to ensure that the amount 
of information produced by companies or analysts together is as much as was 
produced before Regulation FD, the total impact on the market would not be 
beneficial if the information in the new system is less reliable than before. A 
loss in reliability could result in several places after Regulation FD. 
 
 
 66. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,732-33 (Aug. 15, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 243, 249). 
 67. Id. at 51,716-17. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Robert McGough, Call It Courage: Bold Analysts Buck the Trend on Sell Ratings, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 2, 2001, at C1 (reporting that only 2.1% of all analysts recommendations tracked by Thomson 
Financial/IBES in mid-December 2000 were classified as “sell” or “underperform” in contrast to 
31.2% “strong buys” and 39.6% “buys”). See also Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get It So 
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, at C1 (reporting that, of 8000 analysts’ recommendations covering 
companies in the S & P 500 Index, only 29 are “sells,” less than one-half of one percent). 
 70. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731 (“[I]t will allow analysts to express their honest 
opinions without fear of being denied access to valuable corporate information being provided to their 
competitors.”). 
 71. Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts Earnings 
Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 25 J. ACCT. & ECON. 101127, 101127 (1998) (reporting 
data indicating that lead and co-underwriter analysts’ growth forecasts and recommendations are 
significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p615 Thompson.doc  12/20/2001   9:20 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
630 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:615 
 
 
 
 
For much firm-specific information, the company will be the best and 
cheapest source of information. To the extent that the company is not able to 
pass on information that it did prior to Regulation FD, there will be 
additional costs and greater uncertainty in getting the information to the 
market as well as a greater likelihood of overproduction of information.72 
Even if the company conveys information to others, reliability can 
decrease if the recipient is less able to interact with the speaker and thus 
judge the sensitivity of the message. An analyst sitting across a table or 
having an opportunity to talk with a company representative will receive a 
different message than one who is only one of hundreds or more in a 
conference call transmitted via the Internet. 
The relationship between companies and analysts is a repeat play game in 
which the crucial point of intersection is not discrete, easily digestible 
information, but a complex, ongoing relationship in which getting an 
accurate picture of today’s new information requires prior investment in 
reputations and credibility.73 Under the pre-FD approach, companies had the 
primary incentives to develop an information system with the analyst. 
Because companies controlled the selective information, they could decide 
which analysts received it. As the SEC release identified, this control gave 
companies the opportunity to emphasize nonefficiency reasons for 
distributing the information.74 Nevertheless, companies also had the greatest 
incentive to release information in a way that maximized firm income.75 
By forbidding selective disclosure, the SEC encourages development of 
an alternative system in which analysts have the greater incentive to develop 
reputations about information not contained in mandatory disclosure 
documents. What is the basis for assuming that analysts will do better than 
issuers? A recent paper by Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovskey makes 
a broader claim that analysts can outperform insiders in providing efficiency 
and liquidity to the market.76 They argue analysts have an advantage as to 
firm-specific information as well as general market information.77 Relying on 
this argument, Goshen and Parchomovskey note the positive externalities 
 
 
 72. Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Low, Analysts’ Earnings Estimates are Diverging, and 
SEC Disclosure May Be the Reason, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2000, at C2 (reporting BulldogResearch 
study that analysts’ estimates for the third quarter of 2000 became more dispersed than in the second 
quarter). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets and ‘Negative’ 
Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
 77. Id. at 28-30. 
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that result from creating an information market that would accompany a 
greater dependence on analysts in our information system.78  
IV. REASONS FOR REGULATION FD BEYOND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
AMOUNT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
The SEC’s argument for a ban on selectively disclosed information does 
not depend on avoiding any decrease in the amount of available information. 
Even if an adverse effect on information were conceded, the SEC rests the 
Regulation on: (1) possible adverse economic consequences that may accrue 
even with more information and (2) on societal harms from selective 
disclosure that may not be measured in economic terms.79 
A. Economic Harm 
The economic costs that the new Regulation would remove or reduce, 
even if the selective disclosure ban produces less overall information, draw 
on well-developed arguments in the long-running debate over regulation of 
insider trading.80 In efficiency terms, it is an adverse selection problem. 
Investors may be reluctant to trade with those who know more than they do. 
“We agree with the common sense view—expressed by both the Supreme 
Court and the Congress—that investors will lose confidence in a market they 
believe is unfairly rigged against them.”81 Either investors will leave the 
market, which will decrease liquidity, or they will require a greater return to 
take the risk of dealing with those who have superior information. For 
example, market makers might increase the bid-ask spread, or there may be 
an increase in volatility and, perhaps, the costs of capital. To the extent that 
management internalizes these costs,82 any economic impact may be negated.  
These arguments about selective disclosure are the same as those 
traditionally made as to insider trading. As with insider trading, it is difficult 
to measure when someone has left the market. Overall, the U.S. securities 
markets continue to experience widespread investor confidence.83  
 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
 80. Compare, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fisckel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983), with James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical 
Response to the “Chicago Schools,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628. 
 81. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731. 
 82. For ways in which management can internalize the costs, see supra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
 83. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 786 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit DeGeest eds., 1998) (noting that stock market 
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B. Evil 
The argument against selective disclosure is not confined to economic 
terms. In fact, the noneconomic aspects may dominate the argument. 
Certainly, the language of the proposals suggests the fairness arguments that 
provided the basis for the SEC’s early action against insider trading. Former 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt termed selective disclosure “a stain” on our 
market,84 and former SEC general counsel Harvey Goldschmid presented 
selective disclosure as “an evil.”85 Those phrasings of the problem hearken 
back to the early days in the development of federal insider trading law, 
when the focus was on broad principles of fairness. Such comments also 
seem to have more in common with Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent in 
Dirks than with the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in that case—the most 
notable legal source prior to Regulation FD in framing the discussion about 
analysts’ conduct. In Dirks, the Court overturned an insider-trading claim 
against analyst Raymond Dirks using laudatory language about the 
importance of the analyst’s role.86 Justice Blackmun dissented and 
specifically rejected the Court’s justification that the benefit to shareholders 
exceeded the harm.87 In Blackmun’s view, the benefit to society as a whole 
from additional information did not justify losses to individual 
shareholders.88 Blackmun suggested an analyst’s role in exposing fraud but 
trading on that information was analogous to misprision of a felony and 
emphasized the analyst’s ethical obligation to report the information, but not 
to make any profit.89 The majority opinion on the other hand, acknowledged 
the beneficial effect on information provided by the analyst,90 and defined 
fraud as the breach of a fiduciary duty of a particular person, not the effect of 
 
 
performance after highly publicized insider trading scandals undercuts the market integrity argument). 
 84. Arthur Levitt, Speech Before the Economic Club of New York, Oct. 19, 1999, at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/sppech/speecharchives/1999/spch304.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2001).  
 85. Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 38. 
 86. Id. at 658-59 (describing market analysts as “necessary to the preservation of a healthy 
market”). 
 87. 463 U.S. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s rationale by 
paraphrasing “in other words, [because] the end justifies the means”). 
 88. Id. Dirks, an analyst, was approached by Secrist, an insider who knew that a firm’s current 
management was engaged in fraud. Id. at 649. Dirks investigated the fraud allegations and shared his 
conclusions with clients and friends. Id. Eventually, Dirks’ investigation prompted California state 
authorities to investigate the fraud. Id. However, many of the company’s stockholders lost money 
when the company’s stock price fell. Id. 
 89. Id. at 677-78. 
 90. Id. at 658 n.18 (“[U]ntil the Equity Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading 
market was grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks’ effort, the fraud might well have gone undetected 
longer.”) (citation omitted). 
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harm to a trader from an imbalance in information.91 The SEC’s final release 
emphasized the effect on shareholders,92 as opposed to the wrongful actions 
of a defendant in breach of a fiduciary duty, in the same way as the pre-
Chiarella federal courts93 and Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Dirks 
emphasized the effect on shareholders.94 
Insider trading law has moved back in the direction of its early roots and 
the focus there on fairness.95 In United States v. O’Hagan,96 the Supreme 
Court accepted a broad reading of duty that would extend the reach of insider 
trading obligations.97 The SEC, in promulgating Regulation FD based on 
fairness principles, fits within this developing trend. 
C. Is Selective Disclosure the Same as Insider Trading? 
The SEC places Regulation FD squarely within the space of the long-
standing debate about insider trading. The final release’s explanation for the 
need for the regulation begins with an explicit tie to insider trading and the 
loss of investor confidence.98 
Given the strong link to insider trading, and to parts of the history of the 
insider trading debate, it is worth examining the closeness of the connection. 
Think about the universe of all relevant information not known to the market 
and ask: what subset of the group possessing such information could trade 
without incurring insider trading liability? Classic insider trading doctrine 
blocks trading by officers and others who have a fiduciary duty to the 
company, for whose shares the information is material.99 Legal theory in the 
 
 
 91. Id. at 657 (“Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion 
that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading . . . .”). 
 92. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (noting that analysts and “market insiders” made 
money from selectively disclosed information at the expense of shareholders “kept in the dark.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d 
Cir. 1968). 
 94. See Dirks, 461 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It makes no difference to the 
shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the transaction; 
the shareholder still has lost because of the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information.”). 
 95. See Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between 
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1648 (1999) (characterizing O’Hagan as 
an “arguable revival of the long-discredited equal access theory of liability”). See generally Elliott J. 
Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 
395 (1998).  
 96. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 97. Id. at 661-66. 
 98. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
243, 249) (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)). 
 99. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 660-61 (describing the Chiarella case). See also Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. 
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1970s and 1980s extended that duty in two ways to individuals who received 
information from such insiders. If the information was given wrongfully or 
“tipped”—as measured by a personal benefit received by the tipper—and the 
tippee knew the transfer was wrongful, the recipient inherited the insider’s 
duty not to trade.100 Alternatively, if the information was conveyed rightfully 
with the expectation that it would be kept confidential, as when a corporation 
brings a lawyer or investment banker into its confidence in order to do a deal, 
then there, too, the recipient inherits the duty not to trade.101 In 1997, 
O’Hagan confirmed the extension of duty to include a fourth group: 
recipients who gain the information not from the insider under the 
circumstances just described, but in breach of a fiduciary relationship owed 
to someone other than the corporation whose shares were being traded.102 
That same case upheld the extension of liability to a fifth group under Rule 
14e-3: anyone who receives material information in connection with a tender 
offer.103 
The Dirks case, like Chiarella decided by the court three years before, 
explicitly rejected the lower court reasoning that had framed insider trading 
and disclosure theory as focusing on equality of information and the effect on 
investors.104 The Supreme Court rejected drawing the line based on mere 
possession of information and required some wrongful conduct.105 An 
analyst like Dirks, who got information from an insider without an 
expectation of confidence–or by breach of an insider’s duty—would be 
among those who are free to trade.106 This rests both on the absence of a 
wrongful purpose by the insider and also on the positive role analysts play in 
providing useful information to the market.107 
Regulation FD does not seek to impose liability on analysts.108 Those who 
engage in selective disclosure could face SEC action, but not private liability 
for damages.109 Yet, the effect of Regulation FD is to redraw the line 
regarding what transfers of information are permissible. There is now a sixth 
category of recipients of information that the government frowns upon: any 
 
 
 100. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 101. Id. at 655 n.14. 
 102. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 659. 
 103. Id. at 675. 
 104. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). 
 105. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64. 
 106. Id. at 661-63. 
 107. Id. at 658-59, 662-64. 
 108. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000) (imposing liability only on issuers or persons acting on 
behalf of an issuer); 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2000) (defining “person acting on behalf of an issuer”). 
 109. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000) (“No failure to make a public disclosure required 
solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of rule 10b-5 . . . .”). 
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transfer of information from an insider to an analyst –even if no improper 
personal benefit is going to the tipper and, and even if no expectations of 
confidentiality exist for the recipient.110 The Dirks Court did not want to 
include this category.111 Within the space provided by O’Hagan, and in the 
guise of not establishing a liability rule, the SEC has reversed the legal 
consequences of the analyst’s conduct discussed in Dirks. 
The “evil” and “stain” element of selective disclosure to analysts is 
exemplified by Goldschmid’s example of a CEO picking up the phone to tell 
two or three favored analysts: “The stock will be down badly next week” 
followed by trading by the favored analysts and their favored clients.112 To 
come within existing insider trading liability, the SEC would have to prove 
that the CEO received a personal benefit or that the information was 
communicated for a confidential purpose to make the recipient a temporary 
insider.113 The most egregious possibility is that the insider receives some 
disguised personal benefit, but it cannot be proven. In that sense, Regulation 
FD would be a way to penalize action long considered within the law’s 
intended scope.114 But that does not seem to be the principal focus of the 
Regulation. The CEO may have picked the particular analyst for company 
purposes, such as to create a sense of beholdenness so that their reports 
would be favorable to the company.115 What Regulation FD does, then, is to 
insure that insiders, in the process of looking out for the company, do not 
create negative externalities for society by reducing the amount of negative 
information about their company.116  
Of course, Regulation FD reaches further than these exact situations. It 
also precludes conversations such as those where the information cannot be 
revealed to the market credibly or where the analyst’s specific knowledge 
would be helpful to shareholders as a group. The universe of company 
contact with analysts is difficult to separate between those that have an 
appearance of evil and those that are benign or even helpful. Even conduct at 
the worst end of this spectrum does not involve the personal gain that has 
 
 
 110. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a); Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
 111. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59, 662-64. 
 112. Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 38. 
 113. The SEC notes that it brought and settled one action on this theory. See Final Release, 65 
Fed. Reg. at 51,716 n.7. 
 114. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (noting that an insider has an illegal intent to defraud and 
deceive shareholders when the insider receives some “pecuniary gain or reputational benefit” in 
exchange for inside information). 
 115. Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17. 
 116. See Final Release, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17 (noting that issuers sometimes place subtle 
pressures on analysts to report favorably). 
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long been core to insider trading.117 
 Regulation FD is based on the widely shared view that the perception of 
fairness is an important foundation underlying the strength of American 
securities markets. It illustrates the expressive function of law. But arguments 
based on fairness bring their own set of challenges. Why are some 
informational advantages permitted but not others? As Professor Kim 
Krawiec has observed, “[I]nvestors are likely to feel that such transactions 
are unfair regardless of whether the unshared information was acquired 
through breach of a fiduciary duty, through theft, from a disclosure made to 
analysts in a closed session, or from information that, while public in theory, 
is simply beyond the reach of the average investor.”118 A rule based on 
unfairness is particularly difficult in a transnational setting, where notions of 
fairness vary across cultures. Regulation FD itself excludes foreign issuers, 
so that even within the same market of American investors, Regulation FD’s 
broader definition of fairness is limited to domestic issuers only.119 Fairness 
might help communicate the SEC’s brand name as a protector of investors, 
but will not necessarily improve the overall benefit to investors if it sparks a 
backlash of less cooperation by those who resent an overbroad 
characterization of their conduct as evil.120 
There are other areas where we continue to permit trading with an 
information advantage, for example, where underwriters enter the market 
after an initial public offering to “stabilize” the price.121 Regularly the SEC 
and the courts have to trade fairness for efficiency, and favor benefits in the 
market for corporate control versus benefits in the market for shares. If 
Regulation FD were based on empirical evidence that the pejorative selective 
disclosure exceeded the helpful selective disclosure, the weight of evidence 
may well be in favor of the regulation’s need. The fairness argument in the 
absence of such evidence, however, seems to reflect simply a sense of 
fairness that could support limits on any encroachment on equality of 
information.  
 
 
 117. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (describing the illegality of revealing inside information for 
personal gain). 
 118. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of 
the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 443, 479 (2001). 
 119. 17 C.F.R. § 101(b) (2000). 
 120. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability: A Study of Law 
and Strategic Behavior, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001).  
 121. See Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.104 (2000). Another example is warehousing in 
connection with a tender offer which Rule 14e-3 would prohibit. In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court 
stated that “we leave for another day . . . the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3(a) as applied to warehousing.” 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672 n.17. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Information about a company comes to the market in a variety of ways, 
including both the company itself and analysts. Regulation FD, debated 
against a backdrop of full and fair disclosure, prefers the latter to the former. 
The impact on full disclosure is uncertain, but more likely than not the new 
regime will mean somewhat less disclosure. Reasons outside of efficiency 
can tip the balance in favor of a ban. But by drawing a tight analogy to 
insider trading, the SEC has taken the last forty years of legal doctrine and 
stretched it to a factual circumstance that is less pejorative than any of the 
prior uses.  
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